According to an editorial review summarizing the news, the investigation commission’s report highlights the inadequate information sharing among security agencies regarding the preparations for the Janajati movement. Statements from security personnel revealed discrepancies in the information about the movement’s preparations. The events on 7 and 8 September exposed significant coordination gaps between the agencies.
Kathmandu, 11 March — The investigation commission’s report clarifies that sufficient information was not shared among security agencies ahead of the Janajati movement held on 7 and 8 September. The report identifies a major shortfall in receiving necessary information across agencies, from the National Investigation Department (NID) to the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, and the Nepal Army, each tasked with intelligence gathering.
The testimonies and details provided by security personnel revealed varied and often conflicting information about the movement’s preparation. Even among police officials, there was notable inconsistency in the intelligence received. Then Inspector General of Police (IGP) Chandrakuver Khapung stated that he was informed the protest would be peaceful. In contrast, then Additional IGP and current IGP Dan Bahadur Karki noted receiving intelligence about discussions on social media platforms like Reddit, Discord, and X (formerly Twitter).
According to Karki’s testimony, “By monitoring information on social media platforms utilized by Janajati, such as Reddit, Discord, and X, we approved a security plan in the District Security Committee meeting and deployed 4,396 police personnel.” Furthermore, then Additional IGP Siddhi Vikram Shah reported that he informed the IGP after rapid dissemination of information about the movement on TikTok, Facebook, Reels, and Discord.
Meanwhile, Om Rana, then Acting DIG of the Kathmandu Valley Police Office at Ranipokhari, remarked that the movement unfolded differently than anticipated. Former SSP Vishva Adhikari of Kathmandu admitted they were unable to predict the scale of the event. The Central Security Committee meeting on 7 September had estimated between 3,000 and 5,000 protesters. Officials acknowledged shortcomings in analyzing prior intelligence.
Anticipating a peaceful protest, arrangements were made for the President to address the National Assembly on 8 September. Police officials expected the Janajati movement to be manageable, with participation capped at around 5,000, whereas the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) expressed an opposing view. Referring to the 7 September meeting, COAS Ashok Raj Sigdel stated, “The National Investigation Department and other security agencies provided information indicating the potential for a widespread movement.” However, the National Security Council was not in session at that time.
While COAS Sigdel mentioned the likelihood of a large-scale protest, former NID Chief Hutaraj Thapa gave a different account, estimating the protester count between 3,500 and 5,000. These varying statements indicate serious flaws in intelligence gathering within the state security structure, resulting in fragmented and incomplete information among security forces about the Janajati movement. Consequently, they were unable to conduct thorough analyses, formulate strategic plans, or execute effective field operations.
During the incidents on 7 and 8 September, in the context of insufficient information, coordination among security agencies deteriorated to its lowest point. Testimonies of security personnel confirm this. Kathmandu’s then SSP Vishva Adhikari revealed, “There were occasionally time lags in tactical movements between Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force, and the command clearance process posed challenges to coordination.” The Army’s focus was not fully directed on crowd control since it was assigned to static duties.
Special Task Force then-SP Rishir Ram Kandel, deployed at the Parliament premises for protest control, clearly pointed out the lack of coordination among security agencies. He stated, “Although the Armed Police Force was nearby on 7 September, it was not as active as expected. On 8 September, a squad of 10–12 Army personnel moved away from the Inspector General of Police’s gate as the unrest intensified, becoming neutral. This exposed the weaknesses in the security mechanism’s coordination.” Another SP from Kathmandu, Apil Raj Bohara, questioned the role of both the Armed Police and the Army, highlighting that “both the Armed Police Force and Army only participated towards the final moments, and neither agency demonstrated the expected professional cooperation, institutional response, nor collective coordination.”
In light of the coordination gaps between security agencies, COAS Sigdel has directed that efforts should be coordinated moving forward. He stated, “When the security situation around the Parliament complex became complicated on 7 September, I instructed coordination with other security agencies and the necessary security preparations as per previous decisions.”
