Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin describe their nearly four-decade-long leadership relationship as one of closest friendship. Russia is China’s largest trading partner, and over 90 percent of the restricted technologies Russia imports come from China. Although there is no formal alliance, China and Russia maintain a strategic partnership driven by shared borders, economic complementarity, and opposition to the West.
Kathmandu, April 18 – Last September, while walking through Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin discussed the potential of human organ transplantation to extend life spans. Putin’s interpreter remarked, ‘Human organs can be transplanted continuously. The longer you live, the younger you become, potentially reaching immortality.’ Xi’s interpreter responded, ‘Some predict that in this century, people could live up to 150 years.’
This rare glimpse revealed the depth of their partnership. Putin is set to return to Beijing this week for the 25th anniversary of the “Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation” treaty. Last week, US President Donald Trump welcomed Xi Jinping with lavish banquets featuring gold tableware and visits to ancient temples. In contrast, Putin’s visit appears more understated, and little advance information has been released.
Kremlin spokespeople hoped for direct insights following the Trump-Xi meeting. Reports indicate that Xi mentioned his friend Putin during talks at Zhongnanhai last week. During the normally closed session, Xi noted that Putin had previously visited this political sanctuary in Beijing. However, Washington’s hopes of driving a wedge between China and Moscow remain unlikely. In recent years, China and Russia have described their relationship as a boundless friendship.
According to Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Eurasia Program, the relationship is unequal, with agreements often on China’s terms. He stated, “Russia is entirely under China’s influence, and China can impose its conditions.” This imbalance is evident in many sectors. Russia accounts for only 4 percent of China’s international trade. China exports to Russia more than to other nations, and its economy significantly surpasses Russia’s. Western sanctions have gradually pushed Moscow closer to Beijing commercially. For example, following US sanctions and British review, Huawei exited the UK’s 5G network but capitalized on Western companies’ absence to become a mainstay in Russia’s telecommunications industry.
Russia is fully aware of the risks posed by this imbalance. Dmitry Trenin, chairman of the Russian International Affairs Council, has written that Russia does not want to become subordinate to anyone. Speaking on China, he said, “Equality must be maintained, and Russia is a great power that cannot be a junior partner.” Moscow has limited alternatives to Beijing, as China provides critical demand and markets essential for Russia’s survival. If China reduces trade amidst worsening Western relations, Russia’s foreign policy would face complications. However, Moscow’s advantage lies in maintaining a firm stance to avoid yielding to Beijing’s pressure.
Marcin Kaczmarski, associate professor of security studies at the University of Glasgow, observes significant imbalance between China and Russia and notes China aims to avoid provoking resistance. He states, “China is not oppressing Russia but behaving in a balanced manner.” This is partly because Russia is a self-aware, proud nation. Gabuev adds that despite Chinese attempts to exert pressure, Russia is not a country to yield immediately. In 2023, during Xi’s visit to Moscow, he urged Putin not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Days later, Russia announced deployment of nuclear arms in Belarus, signaling a reminder of its sovereignty to the world. While the prolonged war in Ukraine may hold Russia accountable, it also represents a strategic asset for Beijing, which is considering a potential attack on Taiwan. Gabuev notes, “Russia can contribute by selling military technology and equipment and assisting China in testing them.” Russia also possesses substantial energy resources strategically important to China. In May, Putin announced significant progress in oil and gas sectors. News emerged that Russian Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation signed preliminary agreements on the long-pending Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. Once completed, this pipeline will deliver 50 billion cubic meters of Russian gas through Mongolia to China, altering the dynamics. Amid crises in the Strait of Hormuz, Russian energy access is a success for China, ensuring not only affordability but also internal energy security amidst increasing global instability.
Not an Alliance but a Strategic Partnership: Despite disagreements, the true nature of the China-Russia relationship is that neither follows the other, as it is not a formal alliance. Bob Loh, former Australian Deputy Head of Mission, says, “Strategic flexibility has made this partnership stronger.” He adds, “This is not an alliance but an evolving strategic partnership that has survived challenges to maintain its existence.” Western analysts often view the Sino-Russian relationship either as an “axis of authoritarianism” united by a shared desire to confront the West or a fragile fraternity likely to fracture. Both perspectives fail to capture the relationship’s depth and complexity.
Although there are imbalances and disagreements, shared interests prevail. According to Bob Loh, even if relations with the West improve, many common grounds remain for these two. The main reason is their 4,300-kilometer shared border, which has been a focal point of disputes. Additionally, their complementary economies and opposition to American dominance in global governance bind them.
On how long this “love affair” will last, a Chinese analyst, speaking anonymously, said that their publicly displayed closeness is only partial—a performance to convey unity and stability. Unlike Western sanctions and penalties over differing values like human rights, Russia and China avoid criticizing each other. Despite Western concerns over China’s Xinjiang human rights abuses and Russia’s opposition figure Navalny’s death, Moscow and Beijing dismiss these issues. Gabuev remarks, “They don’t criticize each other over Xinjiang or Navalny’s poisoning and murder and agree on many matters at the UN. This creates a biological and symbiotic relationship.”
The two countries have a long tradition of cooperation. Gabuev notes, “This pragmatic partnership began in the late 1980s and found similar behavior in China.” Regarding the longevity of this “love affair,” the Chinese analyst says their relationship’s public front is partial and intended to project unity and stability but ultimately is a political tool to resolve interest-based conflicts.
Both governments oppose Western supremacy but differ in approach. Analysts note Russia wants to completely remove American influence globally, while China favors restraint and long-term outcomes. China’s caution over US moves in Iran and the continuity of Trump’s visit preparations confirm this. China still seeks dialogue with Washington to avoid unnecessary tensions, a stance distinct from Russia’s.
Although this partnership is often viewed geopolitically and from a security lens, another key factor is the depth of social ties. At the highest levels, Putin and Xi have consistently sought to display unparalleled friendship. This will be Putin’s 25th visit to China, enhancing interactions between Russian and Chinese officials.
Former British diplomat Charles Parton expresses skepticism about cultural closeness between Chinese and Russian citizens. He says that despite growing imbalance, this reveals long-term weaknesses but expects this relationship is unlikely to break soon. He comments, “Chinese people don’t want to study, live, or buy property in Moscow—they prefer places like Paris, London, or Cyprus.” He believes Russians prefer investing outside China.
However, Gabuev argues that Western sanctions and European visa policies have pushed Russians toward China, accelerating people-to-people contact. Traveling to China has become easier for Russians, with visa-free arrangements and daily flights reaching major cities in hours. Western sanctions have led Russians to increasingly use Chinese phones and cars. Gabuev says, “Exchanges, visa-free travel, payment systems, and navigation have brought China closer than before. Joint research and scholarship programs are further integrating the two societies.”
Despite growing imbalance revealing potential long-term vulnerabilities, the relationship is unlikely to break soon. Despite differences, Bob Loh states, “The China-Russia partnership is flexible. Both sides agree it is important to ensure this partnership does not fail, especially given the lack of viable alternatives.”
