Article Overview
After hosting numerous distinguished guests in his country, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has embarked on a foreign tour. The long-anticipated summit with North Korea was arranged following a tea dialogue between China’s President Xi Jinping and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, as well as direct talks with former US President Donald Trump last month. This marks Xi’s first foreign visit of 2026, aiming to strengthen ties with a volatile neighbor.
“Their relationship is rooted in strategic necessity but also marked by disputes,” says In-Jo Choi, a research fellow at the Sejong Institute in Seoul. Beyond publicly controlled interactions, a meeting between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un is believed to offer Beijing and Pyongyang the chance to add a new dimension to their partnership, described as being “established in blood.”
Despite fluctuations in their bilateral ties, Chinese foreign ministers often characterize the relationship this way. From the outset, these two socialist nations have maintained a delicate balance between external influence and sovereignty. However, Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow have added complexity to the situation.
During the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, China sacrificed thousands of soldiers for North Korea. Chinese leader Mao Zedong deemed North Korea strategically important, likening it to “lips and teeth.” Seeking further military security, North Korea’s founding leader Kim Il Sung established an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1961.
Under Kim Il Sung’s Juche ideology, North Korea ultimately pursued self-reliance. After receiving military support from the two major powers, North Korea reduced the likelihood of becoming a “satellite state.”
At that time, Pyongyang depended on Soviet aid and petroleum. Due to famine, Chinese citizens crossed the Tumen River into border areas and some even attended North Korean schools, which appeared prosperous.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, North Korea lost its key military ally and economic backer. This opened the path for the influential China to become Pyongyang’s primary alliance partner. China is North Korea’s top trading partner, stabilizing border security while maintaining balance with South Korea, a US ally.
“China not only provides sufficient economic aid but also makes transformative investments to prevent North Korea’s collapse and help build full self-reliance,” says Sunhyun Lee from Harvard University’s Asia Center.
In exchange, China expects “calendar discipline”—an unspoken rule encouraging Pyongyang to avoid main provocations considered sensitive to China’s internal affairs and diplomacy. Yet, North Korea has not fully complied.
Increasingly advancing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions has heightened China’s concerns. China desires a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, but North Korea has expanded its nuclear program. In 1964, Kim Il Sung established the Yongbyon nuclear research center, laying the foundation for one of the world’s smallest nuclear arsenals.
In 1985, he signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but violated it by stockpiling plutonium, not anticipating preparations for war. His son Kim Jong Il, who came to power in 1994, used the program as a diplomatic tool.
In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Three years later, it conducted its first nuclear test, prompting tough UN sanctions—which China could not silently accept. China called the test “highly provocative” but refrained from imposing full economic sanctions.
“North Korea’s collapse or severe instability could pose major risks for Beijing, including refugee flows, nuclear uncertainty, and expansion of US or South Korean military influence,” Choi explains, noting these issues as more critical than the problems in Pyongyang’s nuclear program.
Since Kim Jong Un’s rise to power in 2011, he has accelerated the missile program, attempting to shatter Chinese control. He amended the constitution to declare North Korea a nuclear state. Long-term nuclear tests coincided with sensitive leadership transitions, which China quietly observed.
“While Kim Jong Il respected China’s diplomatic timeline, Kim Jong Un has transformed it into a strategic weapon,” Lee notes.
In March 2013, before Xi Jinping’s presidential inauguration, Kim conducted a third nuclear test. After execution orders against Chinese envoys, Xi supported strict UN sanctions, sided with South Korea, and declared North Korea’s nuclear ambitions “unacceptable under any circumstances.”
Seeking to reduce dependence on Beijing, Kim sought Russia as a new partner. Rebuilding relations took time, but in April 2014, the Kremlin forgave 90% of an $11 billion debt and secured trade agreements. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought them even closer.
US estimates indicate Kim has sold over 10 million artillery shells and Grad rockets to Russia for use in Ukraine. Some reports estimate that over 2,300 North Korean soldiers have died fighting alongside Russian forces.
As this closeness grows, China’s interest in North Korea has increased and in 2024, the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement. North Korea is China’s sole formal military partner.
“Following deepened relations between Russia and North Korea after 2024, Beijing is making planned efforts to strengthen ties with Pyongyang,” says Patricia M. Kim of the Brookings Institution. “China does not accept Russia as North Korea’s main strategic partner.”
At the September Victory Day parade, Xi invited Kim and Putin as guests, where Kim was seen standing beside the Chinese leader—a rare and significant sign.
Other high-level commercial and diplomatic efforts have included launching passenger rail services, Air China direct flights, and visits by Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Pyongyang.
Senior expert Lee from the Harvard Asia Center states that Beijing’s quiet support for Kim’s new nuclear doctrine signals a shift in its approach toward its neighboring communist state.
“This change was evident at the May 2018 Trump-Xi summit, where the official declaration removed the term ‘nuclear denuclearization’ and presented Washington with a different perspective,” he explained.
Xi’s visit is likely to further satisfy North Korea. Pyongyang’s strict demonstration of trust is a matter of strategic advantage—not a move to sever lifelines.
“In the emerging strategic triangle, North Korea stands to benefit the most,” Kim says. “Victory on Pyongyang’s side benefits both Moscow and Beijing.”
According to Lee, in reality, Beijing has not lost Pyongyang—what it is losing is its monopoly over the relationship.
