‘New Militarism’ or Strategic Necessity? Japan’s Strategic Expansion in the Indo-Pacific Region

June 23, Kathmandu – Last month at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Japan captured all the attention. When China’s defense chief skipped the event for the second consecutive year, a significant void emerged. Japan capitalized on this gap to use the platform to warn about Beijing’s growing military power.

On May 31, during the final day of the security forum in Singapore, Japan’s Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi addressed the assembly. While Beijing accused Japan of adopting a ‘new militarism,’ Koizumi refuted the allegations, expressing dissatisfaction over China’s rapid military capabilities and raising concerns about a lack of transparency.

A session was planned to discuss China’s partnership in the Asia-Pacific, offering Beijing a chance to present its regional security perspective. However, the session was canceled, further elevating Japan’s prominence at the forum.

Throughout the forum, Tokyo remained at the center of discussions. Koizumi met with U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, reinforcing Washington’s full commitment to the Asia and Indo-Pacific region. This underlined the U.S.-Japan united front, highlighted Japan’s security concerns, and demonstrated its reliance on the alliance.

Tokyo has signaled its intention to bolster its military strength. Koizumi and other senior officials publicly discussed plans last year to develop nuclear-powered attack submarines, potentially breaking Japan’s longstanding nuclear prohibition policy. Speculations have arisen domestically and internationally that this move could pave the way for Japan acquiring nuclear weapons in the future.

Tokyo has accelerated the expansion of its security partnership network, provoking Beijing, which views this as a threat to regional stability. Japan and the Philippines are enhancing defense cooperation and negotiating agreements to safeguard sensitive military information.

New Zealand shortlisted Japan’s Mogami-class frigates to replace its Anzac-class fleet, a decision welcomed by Koizumi.

Analysts consider these developments pivotal components of a multi-layered military architecture in the Indo-Pacific. A perceived decline in U.S. commitment is seen as an opportunity for Beijing, while a new military framework is emerging that aims to integrate security cooperation with economic relations, incorporate flexible diplomacy, and free countries from the binary choice between China and the U.S.

Experts note that Tokyo lacks the economic capacity to compete with Beijing on equal footing. Japan must collaborate with partners, advancing its China-countering bandwagon cautiously.

Multifaceted Approach

This strategic shift is a response to Washington’s direct competition. In December last year, the Trump administration announced a national security strategy emphasizing U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere while prioritizing “winning the economic future” in the Indo-Pacific.

As U.S. credibility came under question, Trump pressured Japan and South Korea to increase defense budgets and imposed higher tariffs on major partners like India.

According to Stephen Nagy, Professor at International Christian University, Tokyo, this also reflects efforts to protect smaller states from Chinese pressure amid regional instability and waning U.S. reliability.

Pratnasri Basu of the Observer Research Foundation in Delhi states that Tokyo is adopting a new comprehensive outlook and evolving strategy beyond traditional security networks.

Basu explains many Southeast Asian and Pacific island nations prioritize development and economic resilience. Accordingly, Tokyo seeks to link infrastructure financing and energy transition with security cooperation to foster sustainable partnerships.

Tools

Japan implements this strategy using interlocking tools that promote security and development simultaneously.

In May, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi unveiled an updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework designed to modernize former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2016 strategy. It emphasizes maritime security and aims to secure energy supply chains.

Under this blueprint, Tokyo plans to connect its traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA) with Official Security Assistance (OSA) to fund ports and airports.

Strategic studies expert Jumpei Ishimaru from the International Institute for Strategic Studies notes Japan has been directly supporting partner militaries through OSA.

Ryosuke Hanadala, student at Macquarie University in Sydney, explains that prior maritime domain awareness projects heavily relied on development aid. Hence, the defense assistance program was introduced, particularly aiding less-capable partners acquire standard weaponry.

Hanadala adds this program helps Japan avert regional power vacuums in America’s absence.

Basu suggests infrastructure financing is politically more feasible than direct military aid and supports coastguard capacities and defense logistics.

She further states Tokyo views connectivity infrastructure both as a development tool and a strategic enabler.

Security assistance has expanded extensively over three years—from four countries and 2 billion yen initially to 12 countries and 18.1 billion yen currently—supplying advanced radar systems and drones.

Kei Koga from Nanyang Technological University in Singapore interprets this as a program testing Japan’s military expansion beyond mere conceptualization.

Koga’s research on Indo-Pacific security and ASEAN shows this supports Japan’s defense industry indirectly and may enhance its role in the global arms market.

This industry-driven approach aligns with Japan’s expansive export policy. Following the lifting of its ban on lethal weapons exports in April, Japan gained opportunities to supply defense equipment to 17 countries.

This enabled Tokyo to advance talks on a potential export deal for the Asagiri-class destroyer to Indonesia as of June 5.

Additionally, in April, Tokyo launched the $10 billion Power Asia Initiative, aiming to ensure emergency energy supply and contribute to long-term solutions for the Strait of Hormuz crisis.

Ishimaru observes Tokyo is deepening diplomatic, military, and economic ties through security grants and engaging in defense export talks with Indonesia.

On June 10, a bilateral summit between Tokyo and Malaysia produced agreements across three key areas to deepen defense relations.

Leaders agreed on joint naval exercises, maritime cooperation pacts, and acceleration of defense technology collaboration. Japan will bolster Malaysia’s strategic security through drones, surveillance equipment, and support against gray-zone pressures.

Analyst Anwar praised Japan’s lifting of its lethal weapons export ban, calling it the start of broad procurement opportunities.

ASEAN’s Receptiveness

Tokyo leverages deep trust within ASEAN through its strategic toolkit. A 2026 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute survey finds Japan as the most trusted major power in ASEAN, with 65.6% public support, surpassing the U.S., the EU, and China.

According to Koga, Japan’s backing offers regional states strategic alternatives beyond dependence on China or the U.S.

The Philippines exemplifies Japan’s deepest defense partnership in Asia, with joint military exercises and access agreements. Talks are underway for transfer of up to six Abukuma-class destroyers.

Last month, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. elevated the bilateral ties to strategic partnership during a state visit to Japan.

Koga attributes growing closeness between Tokyo and Manila to uncertainties in the Trump administration’s U.S. commitments.

He says, ‘This is not about replacing the alliance but enhancing defense and security ties to demonstrate mutual responsibility.’

However, experts suggest the Philippines is an exception, with other ASEAN countries unlikely to pursue such deep partnerships.

John Bradford of the Yokusuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies says Manila and Tokyo have agreed on a carefully managed multipolar strategy in the South China Sea, balancing shared risks.

Bradford notes, ‘Both emphasize tension management and cautious engagement in competition with China.’

Ishimaru adds the Philippines holds particular strategic and military importance for Japan, including hosting U.S. bases.

Tensions persist between Beijing and Manila around disputed areas in the South China Sea, and Tokyo’s disputed Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands in the East China Sea also remain a flashpoint.

Limitations and China’s Advantage

Japan faces structural barriers in realizing its strategic ambitions, advantages that China currently possesses.

ASEAN shows significant disengagement, imposing strict limits on defense cooperation. Professor Nagy explains, ‘ASEAN views Japan as a balancing third option between America and China, but their reluctance and entrapment fears place boundaries on military unity.’

He adds ASEAN might adopt some OSA elements but will not abandon open commitments like Japan-Philippines ties.

Japan contends with economic constraints, a declining population, and operational risks that challenge its defense equipment maintenance and support.

The ruling LDP has drafted revisions to three security documents demanding funding to boost defense capacity within five years. Reports suggest the budget could exceed 3 percent of GDP, raising concerns.

The LDP plans to present these to the prime minister this month and secure cabinet approval by year-end. Takaichi announced achieving a 2 percent defense spending goal by 2025.

Hanadala warns of long-term maintenance and support system problems, noting OSA equipment is managed by the foreign ministry, potentially separating support functions.

He observes, ‘Until resolved, depth of coordination and trust in capabilities will remain limited.’

Some analysts doubt Tokyo’s ability to withstand Beijing’s economic pressures. Japan faces financial and military challenges, and Koga advises extreme caution in building an anti-China coalition.

Koga concludes, ‘This caution encourages greater alertness among regional states.’