Nepali Army Played an Effective Role in Crisis Management During the Jana Andolan

Why did the security agencies fail in providing early warning and analysis of the events on 23rd Bhadra 2082?

It is certain that the intelligence system failed to provide adequate early warning. However, in my understanding, the issue was not just the lack of information. Even when information was received, it was not seriously analyzed nor incorporated into timely decision-making. The state’s investment in intelligence, its capacity, professionalism, and effectiveness are crucial factors.

Intelligence work goes beyond gathering information; it must analyze risks, estimate possible event trajectories, and provide clear strategic warnings about what preparations are necessary to prevent or manage crises.

Before 23rd Bhadra, there were ample indications of growing unrest among youths, digital activism, and social media-driven dissatisfaction. However, security agencies appeared to regard these signals superficially as possible demonstrations, gatherings, or riots. This constitutes, in my view, the first major security failure.

Strategic warnings differ significantly from routine information. Receiving reports that thousands of youths might take to the streets is insufficient. Understanding their underlying grievances, leadership, organizational structure, social media psychology, potential for violence, and whether state decisions might exacerbate or suppress the unrest is essential and requires deep analysis.

Therefore, I categorize the security failure of 23rd Bhadra into three levels: first, failure in intelligence gathering; second, failure in analysis; and third, failure in converting analysis into effective decisions and security preparations.

The security apparatus also appeared to fail on 24th Bhadra. What might have caused this?

The events of 23rd and 24th Bhadra should not be seen through a single lens. Human losses and public anger from 23rd Bhadra escalated the crisis on 24th Bhadra, but complexity increased due to other factors as well.

Following the significant human losses on the 23rd, a renewed security risk assessment was imperative on the 24th. The first principle of crisis management is to re-evaluate circumstances after any major event. Psychological, social, and political repercussions must be integrated into security assessments.

The incidents at Tinkune, the events of 23–24 Bhadra, and those in Sunsari are not isolated; they represent different dimensions of Nepal’s evolving internal security. They demonstrate that traditional views of internal security focusing on peace, order, and law enforcement are insufficient and that a reconsideration within the national security framework is necessary.

On 24th Bhadra, the situation escalated beyond a normal protest, evolving into a severe crisis affecting sensitive infrastructure and strategic institutions. Destruction and arson at critical sites such as the Supreme Court and Singha Durbar revealed the criticality of the situation and exposed weaknesses in state crisis management.

This should be viewed not simply as a failure of security forces, but as a reflection of the state’s overall weakness in crisis management. In moments of crisis, the existence of alternative plans, clear orders, control structures, and coordination among security agencies significantly influences the effectiveness of the response.

In my opinion, the key lesson from the events of 24th Bhadra is that as security challenges evolve, threat assessment, decision-making processes, and crisis response systems must also be adapted and strengthened. It is imperative to predict and prepare for incidents in advance rather than simply respond after they occur.

Were the events of 23rd and 24th Bhadra merely a reaction to social media restrictions or public anger?

No. While social media bans might have been a trigger, attributing these events solely to that is superficial. These were an eruption of long-standing social, political, and economic frustrations, comprising five main elements.

First, deep dissatisfaction with governance—corruption, lack of political accountability, absence of opportunity, and frustration with state mechanisms.

Second, youth aspirations and lack of prospects—disparities in employment, opportunities, and economic potential.

Third, digital mobilization—today’s youth are not mere consumers but producers and transmitters of information with the capacity to mobilize large groups. Social media thus becomes not only a communication tool but a strategic platform for politics and influence.

Fourth, a crisis of trust between the state and society—when trust erodes, even minor incidents can trigger massive dissatisfaction. The human losses on 23rd Bhadra deepened this mistrust.

Therefore, Nepal’s security assessments must incorporate not only visible street gatherings but also digital spaces, information environments, social psychology, and potential influence campaigns. Modern conflicts often originate largely in the digital realm and have the potential to destabilize the state rapidly.

Fifth, the potential threats posed by information and influence operations.

Until confirmed, involvement by external or internal groups should not be concluded prematurely. However, disinformation, misinformation, cyber influence, coordinated digital campaigns, and the influence of various interest groups seen in security analyses cannot be ignored.

Hence, limiting the interpretation of 23–24 Bhadra solely as a reaction to social media restrictions is strategically flawed. The pertinent question is why a single restriction triggered such widespread unrest. The answer lies in the long-accumulated dissatisfaction between the state and society.

The death of a student at the hands of the state on the 23rd was unacceptable under any circumstance. Attacks and arson on national sovereignty pillars—such as the historic administrative heritage of Singha Durbar—on the 24th represent a serious assault on freedom and state authority. Simultaneous attacks on the judiciary, legislature, and executive, including mob-style attacks where police had control, cannot be considered ordinary incidents. The state’s critical institutions collapsing within four to five hours pose a grave national security challenge.

Can these be understood from the perspectives of hybrid warfare or gray-zone activities?

Yes. The indications from 23–24 Bhadra correspond to aspects of hybrid conflict and gray-zone activities, which typically avoid conventional weapon use and instead employ information, cyber means, social division, and political pressure as strategic tools. In Nepal, these were manifested via digital platforms. Evidence shows protestors utilized Discord, TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), Telegram, among others.

The digital domain played a crucial role during 23–24 Bhadra events. Determining whether there were disinformation campaigns, coordinated influence operations, or foreign involvement requires thorough intelligence investigation.

This form of hybrid warfare is often leaderless or decentralized, posing challenges for the state such as identifying negotiation interlocutors, decision-makers, and actual objectives. The Nepalese state confronted similar challenges on 24th Bhadra.

Thus, reducing the events to a mere reaction to social media restrictions overlooks internal issues such as governance weaknesses, youth dissatisfaction, corruption, declining trust in the state, and strategic exploitation of these vulnerabilities by opposition forces.

The conclusion is clear: Nepal’s security assessments must no longer be based solely on street protests but must integrate the digital domain, information environment, social psychology, and influence operations into intelligence analysis. Modern conflict often begins in the digital space and can quickly devastate the state.

Did lack of coordination between security agencies prevent effective control on 24th Bhadra?

Both sides of this issue need to be viewed. Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, National Investigation Department, and the Nepali Army each have distinct roles and jurisdictions based on necessity. The problem is not an overlap of responsibilities but whether these agencies shared a joint intelligence picture, exchanged intelligence effectively, had clear command structures, and implemented defined operational frameworks during crises.

On 23rd Bhadra, there were weaknesses in intelligence sharing, threat assessment, and operational readiness. The situation on 24th escalated rapidly from normal protests to a serious threat to critical state infrastructure, with limitations on available manpower, legal authority, command decision-making ability, and force deployment capacities becoming apparent.

When security agencies perform well, the government tends to take credit; when unpleasant events occur, the tendency is to blame all security forces. This is impractical. State and political leadership sets direction and security agencies act within constitutional and legal boundaries as directed by the government.

The situation on 24th Bhadra was extremely volatile, seriously challenging constitutional governance. Had the Nepali Army not played an effective role, the conditions could have been even worse.

Signs of hybrid warfare and gray-zone activities are evident in the Jana Andolan, characterized by the use of non-military forces.

Therefore, dismissing security agencies outright without considering the crisis’s complexity, political decisions, security pressures, and limited options is inappropriate. The emphasis should be on learning and constructive reform rather than blame.

Simplistic conclusions like ‘security forces could have easily prevented it’ are misleading. The vulnerability of sensitive state structures in a short time signals weaknesses in preparedness, forecasting, and response capacities.

The fairness of investigation commissions, depth of inquiry, and inclusion of all stakeholders remain important topics of public debate. The roles of Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, National Investigation Department, and Nepali Army have all been questioned but should not be ascribed as faults of a single agency.

The key takeaway is not only coordination but shared intelligence, clear command and control, crisis response planning, and joint operations are essential within the security sector.

How are changing security challenges impacting national security?

The Jana Andolan introduced new challenges to Nepal’s internal security—digital mobilization and sudden mass participation. Unlike traditional movements with clear leadership and structures, modern social media-driven groups can mobilize large numbers rapidly without leadership. This is a novel challenge.

Sunsari events also highlighted the importance of early warning, coordination, and emergency security measures at local levels. Identifying and preventing violence may be more successful than controlling it after occurrence.

These events will seriously affect Nepal’s national security: weakening trust between citizens and state, impacting morale within security institutions, increasing political instability and social polarization, and opening opportunities for external actors to exploit national vulnerabilities.

Hence, national security is no longer just about borders but involves governance, economy, social relations, information environments, cyber security, diplomacy, and citizen-state trust.

An updated national security policy and a long-term strategic framework are necessary, unaffected by changes in government, stable, and oriented to enduring national interests.

Does the Jana Andolan signal a fundamentally different security challenge going forward?

The events of 23–24 Bhadra show Nepal’s security challenges are rapidly evolving while structures remain rooted in traditional models. For instance, debates over where to place the National Investigation Department reflect issues of clarity and stability. Intelligence systems should be state strategic security entities, not provisional mechanisms serving party interests.

Security is not merely controlling an event after occurrence. Modern security requires risk identification, tension analysis, preventive measures, and maintaining citizen trust to effectively manage crises.

Therefore, Nepal needs a clear national security structure and a long-term intelligence strategy specifying which agencies handle strategic intelligence, domestic intelligence, and analysis respectively.

Intelligence involves not only ‘who collected how much information’ but also who identified change signals, interpreted their strategic meaning, forecasted risks, and provided reliable warnings to decision-makers in time.

Similarly, security requires capacities not only for control after incidents but for preemptive risk identification, preventive actions, trust maintenance, and clear command and control over all security agencies during deployment.

Operational roles, responsibilities, and resources of Nepal Police and Armed Police Force must be clearly demarcated. Using both in the same task inefficiently should be avoided. Clear constitutional and legal role division will reduce duplicated resource usage and enhance command-control in crises.

In my view, Tinkune, the events of 23–24 Bhadra, and Sunsari are interconnected encounters with broader security challenges. The state has a clear message—internal security should no longer be viewed only through traditional lenses of peace, order, and law enforcement but must be rethought within the national security structure.

This necessitates intelligence-based security, precautionary security, integrated intelligence analysis, inter-agency coordination, digital security risk assessments, and strengthened strategic crisis management. National security success depends not on responses after events but on prior detection and preparation. Otherwise, future crises will result in recurring finger-pointing over where security agencies failed.