Author: space4knews

May 18, Kathmandu – Following US President Donald Trump’s visit to China, Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to begin a two-day official visit to China starting Tuesday.

A spokesperson from the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced last Saturday that this state visit is at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping. The Kremlin had earlier released a statement confirming Putin’s visit to China.

Previously, Trump conducted a formal visit to China from May 13 to 15, marking the first such visit by a US president in nearly a decade.

However, despite bringing along CEOs of top US tech companies, Trump’s visit concluded without any agreements announced. Putin will arrive in Beijing just three days later.

According to a statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Putin and Xi Jinping plan to discuss bilateral ties, China-Russia partnership, and ways to strengthen strategic cooperation. They will also exchange views on important international and regional issues.

Both countries plan to issue a joint statement at a high level and sign several bilateral documents. Additionally, the heads of state will participate in the opening ceremony of the China-Russia Year of Education.

Efforts to Strengthen Relations

Russia views Putin’s visit as a celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Treaty, signed in 2001 in Moscow between then Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Putin.

The most recent meeting between Putin and Xi took place last September at the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They also attended a military parade on September 3 commemorating the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II, alongside North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.

In May, Xi Jinping visited Moscow on a four-day state visit at Putin’s invitation and participated in the Victory Day celebrations marking the Soviet Union’s triumph in the Great Patriotic War.

This marks Xi’s 11th visit to Russia since becoming president, making Russia the country he has visited most frequently. He has described China and Russia as integral neighbors, partners, and friends.

According to Reuters, Putin and Xi have met over 40 times in recent years. In February 2022, they signed a ‘no-limits’ strategic partnership agreement, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Despite increased international sanctions on Russia following the Ukraine conflict, China has refrained from publicly criticizing Russia or supporting those sanctions. Political and economic cooperation between the two countries has continued, with Russia’s economic dependence on China growing.

Last September, China and Russia signed a legally binding agreement to build the ‘Power of Siberia-2’ natural gas pipeline.

Russian media outlet RT reported that Putin is expected to visit China twice in 2026 and will participate in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit scheduled to be held in Shenzhen in November.

Russia’s Perspective on China-US Dialogue

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has stated that China and the US will not adopt a ‘divide and rule’ approach. He noted, ‘If there is or will be agreement between China and the US, it will be in our Chinese friends’ interest and will please us.’

Lavrov further emphasized that China-Russia relations go beyond traditional military and political alliances, describing them as deeper and more reliable. This new relationship could ensure global political and economic stability.

Putin’s visit has attracted international attention. The South China Morning Post noted that the visit is routine, with no expectation of grand military parades or elaborate welcome ceremonies.

This presents a unique occasion for China to host leaders of two powerful countries within one month.

It signals China’s intent to maintain balanced relations with both nations. In the current complex global environment, China appears intent on positioning itself as a significant and decisive power.

Political analyst Huang Weiguo observes that power competition among China, the US, and Russia manifests differently in their triangular relations. He believes Trump’s China visit will not affect China-Russia relations.

Huang added, ‘Although the US and Russia appear adversarial, the US seeks a mediating role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and aims to portray itself as a peace-establishing nation.’ He assesses that among the three, China holds the greatest advantage.

Huang also noted, ‘If Trump returns to power, relations between the US and European countries could become tense. Meanwhile, European nations have increased visits to China and maintained relatively less confrontational relations.’

In this relatively turbulent global atmosphere, China seems capable of establishing diplomatic ties with some Western countries and persuading allies of opposing blocs to its side.

Focus on Trump’s Visit

Meanwhile, following Trump’s China trip, an invitation has been extended to Xi Jinping to visit the White House in September. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also confirmed Xi’s visit to the US will take place this year.

The announcement of Putin’s China visit came within 24 hours after Trump’s visit ended, scheduled one week later.

Russian state news agency TASS quoted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stating that they are closely monitoring media coverage related to President Trump’s China trip and expect to obtain direct information during Putin’s visit.

Peskov added that during the upcoming China-Russia meeting, they will exchange views on recent communications between China and the US. He said, ‘Direct dialogue between the leaders of the world’s two largest economies will draw the attention of all countries, especially Russia.’

In the spring of 2024, Iran directly attacked Israeli territory for the first time by launching over 300 drones and missiles against its adversaries. These attacks were swiftly intercepted by American, British, French, and Jordanian forces. This incident sent a clear message to the Gulf states: when Iran attacks Israel, there will be immediate collective retaliation led by the US. But a challenging question arose—what happens if Iran targets the Gulf states themselves?

That question began to be answered on February 28 when, in response to American and Israeli strikes, Iran attacked airports, ports, oil refineries, and water infrastructure in Arab Gulf nations and closed the Strait of Hormuz. This action halted exports from Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, while severely disrupting trade in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Though the US military helped intercept some of these attacks, the events inflicted significant damage on regional commerce and security credibility. Iran’s clear objective was to strike the security architecture that enabled US-Israeli military operations in the area.

For decades, Gulf states maintained neutrality in their conflicts with Iran while sustaining security partnerships with the United States. However, the current situation has prompted them to reassess these strategies and signals their rejection of a security framework dominated by Israeli regional hegemony.

For American and Israeli leaders, a security framework where Israel holds decisive military superiority in the region and asserts dominance over neighbors seemed logical. Gulf Arab states planned to cooperate with Israel against Iran’s nuclear program and its destabilizing proxies.

But the ongoing war reveals that Israeli ambitions to consolidate regional dominance are placing Gulf states at risk. Israel appears ready to engage in aggressive warfare, disregarding neighboring interests. Many Gulf leaders now seek alternative measures to ensure their security, diversifying arms supplies and partnerships while enhancing diplomatic and military coordination.

A Shared Enemy of a Shared Foe

For a long time, Gulf Arab states have agreed to formally recognize Israel only after the return of Palestinian territories. Some have normalized relations with Israel in the past decade, but none have embraced Israeli hegemonic ambitions in any capacity.

Israel’s military campaign in Gaza has killed over 70,000 Palestinians and moved to annex the West Bank. These actions have weakened Israel’s regional standing. Gulf leaders find that their interests in this war do not align with Israel’s.

Although Gulf nations have sought diplomatic solutions to counter US attacks on Iran, once hostilities began, Iran targeted Gulf countries directly. This made clear that Gulf states cannot abandon American military presence and remain neutral.

The conflict has divided Gulf countries into three groups: Oman leans towards restraint and balance; the UAE, after failed efforts to improve relations with Iran, has adopted a tougher security stance; while other countries take moderate or mixed approaches.

Overall, Gulf states harbor strong distrust towards Iran, fueled by instability orchestrated by Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, as well as recent attacks within the Gulf region.

Towards Multipolarity

Iran’s attacks may catalyze Gulf states to overcome internal differences and establish independent security architectures. While they have relied heavily on US defense ties for decades, they are now seeking diversification.

Gulf states are pursuing alternative arms sources from Turkey, South Korea, Ukraine, Japan, and the UK to reduce dependency on the United States. Europe is also preparing to become a reliable partner.

They hope to expand economic and technological agreements with China, though they remain cautious about military guarantees. This diplomatic flexibility aims to strengthen their position.

The Gulf Club

Gulf nations recognize the need to enhance mutual defense cooperation, including coordinated air defense systems, shared early-warning mechanisms, and integration of anti-drone technologies. Despite having the Gulf Cooperation Council, inter-member rivalries hamper defense integration.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are developing domestic defense industries, yet during the current conflict, Gulf countries faced shortages of interceptor missiles, underscoring the necessity of developing indigenous capabilities.

Washington holds the belief that the security relationship between Gulf states and Israel is complementary and that normalization promotes regional stability; however, recent events have challenged this assumption.

There is a profound disconnect between Netanyahu’s regional vision and the aspirations of Arab Gulf states. These countries desire a security framework that safeguards their sovereign interests without falling under Israeli or Iranian dominance.

From Foreign Affairs